The Qualitative Report
Volume 24

Number 2

How To Article 2

2-2-2019

Nine Rules of Engagement: Reflections on Reflexivity
Thomas Owren
Western Norway University of Applied Sciences, tow@hvl.no

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr
Part of the Inequality and Stratification Commons, Quantitative, Qualitative, Comparative, and
Historical Methodologies Commons, and the Theory, Knowledge and Science Commons

Recommended APA Citation
Owren, T. (2019). Nine Rules of Engagement: Reflections on Reflexivity. The Qualitative Report, 24(2),
228-241. https://doi.org/10.46743/2160-3715/2019.3683

This How To Article is brought to you for free and open access by the The Qualitative Report at NSUWorks. It has
been accepted for inclusion in The Qualitative Report by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more
information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.

Nine Rules of Engagement: Reflections on Reflexivity
Abstract
Wishing to be reflexive, to critically examine our assumptions, is easy. Doing it is less so. For researchers
doing a study in their own professional field, it represents a particular challenge. In this essay, I explore
this challenge using my own study as exemplar. I am researching workplace inclusion of workers with
intellectual disability. As a professional, I have worked with and for people with intellectual disability for
many years. The knowledge I bring to my inquiry – about the inabilities, vulnerabilities and needs ascribed
to persons labelled thus – is deeply entrenched in common culture, as well as in my professional training.
How can I handle this knowledge in my research? To what extent may, or must, it command my
perceptions and interpretations? How may I challenge and look beyond it? Exploring this, I consult a
handful of researchers who have examined pitfalls of involving informants with intellectual disability in
research. I also call upon four giants of social science – Hans-Georg Gadamer, Charles Taylor, Pierre
Bourdieu and Michel Foucault – as well as Brian Eno, British musician and producer extraordinaire.
Departing from a concrete situation, the essay winds its way through nine discussions, each generating a
“rule of engagement.” Although the discussions are specific to my project, these nine methodological
suggestions, ranging from seemingly trivial to decidedly non-trivial, are not. My belief is that they may hold
some interest for any qualitative researcher.

Keywords
Intellectual Disability, Heterotopias, Philosophical Hermeneutics, Reflexivity, Qualitative Research

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 International
License.

This how to article is available in The Qualitative Report: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol24/iss2/2

The Qualitative Report 2019 Volume 24, Number 2, How To Article 1, 228-241

Nine Rules of Engagement: Reflections on Reflexivity
Thomas Owren
Western Norway University of Applied Sciences, Bergen, Norway
Wishing to be reflexive, to critically examine our assumptions, is easy. Doing it
is less so. For researchers doing a study in their own professional field, it
represents a particular challenge. In this essay, I explore this challenge using
my own study as exemplar. I am researching workplace inclusion of workers
with intellectual disability. As a professional, I have worked with and for people
with intellectual disability for many years. The knowledge I bring to my inquiry
– about the inabilities, vulnerabilities and needs ascribed to persons labelled
thus – is deeply entrenched in common culture, as well as in my professional
training. How can I handle this knowledge in my research? To what extent may,
or must, it command my perceptions and interpretations? How may I challenge
and look beyond it? Exploring this, I consult a handful of researchers who have
examined pitfalls of involving informants with intellectual disability in research.
I also call upon four giants of social science – Hans-Georg Gadamer, Charles
Taylor, Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault – as well as Brian Eno, British
musician and producer extraordinaire. Departing from a concrete situation, the
essay winds its way through nine discussions, each generating a “rule of
engagement.” Although the discussions are specific to my project, these nine
methodological suggestions, ranging from seemingly trivial to decidedly nontrivial, are not. My belief is that they may hold some interest for any qualitative
researcher. Keywords: Intellectual Disability, Heterotopias, Philosophical
Hermeneutics, Reflexivity, Qualitative Research

Start
The young man with intellectual disability and his workplace mentor are being
interviewed on stage in front of approximately 700 conference attendees. Both are participants
in a project that aims to stimulate ordinary workplaces to hire and accommodate workers with
intellectual disability – “ordinary” meaning workplaces established to produce or sell goods or
services, not to provide work or work training for particular groups. The need for such projects,
in Norway as in other parts of the world, arises, on one hand, from the common characteristic
of intellectual disability – namely, limitations in “reasoning, problem solving, planning,
abstract thinking, judgment, academic learning, and learning from experience” (American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013, pp. 31-33) – and, on the other, from the ongoing trend
towards an ever more knowledge intensive labor market with higher expectations of
productivity and fewer manual tasks.
The hotel where the conference is held is in the process of hiring nine employees with
intellectual disability – of which the young man is one. He is halfway into his initial four-week
trial period. Asked by the interviewer about his duties, he describes how he starts each morning
by sweeping the pavement outside the hotel. “And yesterday,” he says, “I was hosing down
emergency exits, really enjoying myself.” The audience laughs. The interviewer comments:
“That’s great, lots of people dream of hosing down emergency exits,” and proceeds: “But tell
me, your mentor – is he all right? I mean, in many places there are bosses and colleagues of
whom much might be said. How is it here?” Listening to the exchange, I am thinking that the
interviewer is talking too much, too fast, not giving the young man sufficient time to respond.
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Yet, he responds: “I think he’s a nice chap.” Again, the audience laughs.” And I think he’s an
eager chap,” his mentor says: “The other day, there was quite a lot of litter on the pavement. If
I hadn’t stopped him, he would have swept the pavements all the way down to the concert
hall.” The audience laughs again, giving the young man a big round of applause.
I was in the audience, laughing and applauding with them. The mood was positive and
supportive, the laughter good-natured. Still, I found some aspects of this exchange troubling:
If the comment “lots of people dream of hosing down emergency exits” had been directed to
someone without intellectual disability, would they not have found it condescending? Also,
does it not offend common and professional propriety to publicly ask the young man, still in
his probationary period, what he thinks about his mentor, to whom he is subordinate? And
thirdly, why does his eagerness, the prospect of him sweeping the pavements “all the way to
the concert hall” seven blocks away, garner such merriment and applause? Had he been an
“ordinary” employee (i.e. without an intellectual disability), would it have elicited the same
reaction? And, if not, what perceptions of intellectual disability, what prejudices, may explain
the difference?
My reactions are normative as well as critical. They reveal that I consider some ways
of interacting with people with intellectual disability more proper than others – as well as my
bent towards critical reflection: the examination of how culturally embedded and historically
determined discourses may impact on people’s lives, for example by naturalizing perceptions
of who they are, of what they are capable, and what roles they can fill. This stance is informed
by my professional background as a social worker, specialized in designing supports to people
with intellectual disability, as well as my postgraduate studies in community work with a focus
on representations of disability, conditions for participation, and social justice. For me as a
researcher though, it creates dilemmas: I enter a field where actors cannot be expected to share
my perspectives on intellectual disability, nor the implications of different discourses on
inclusion. However, to see inclusion as a form of social justice makes it more than an academic
issue, by bringing in moral implications with the potential to create ethical and methodological
pitfalls in any research process. Interviewing informants with intellectual disability, as I aim to
do, creates more, as I will expand on later. But behind these issues, even more fundamental
theoretical questions loom: Are not the perceptions and values upon which my normative,
critical stance builds also expressions of prejudices? One of my challenges as a researcher
concerns how to handle the knowledge of my professional training. To what extent may, or
must, it command my perceptions and interpretations? And, if it is so ingrained in the ways I
interpret, that it must be considered an integral part of the means by which I see – how may I
hope to look beyond it? Such are the questions I explore in this essay. A key concept is
reflexivity – which can be understood as a “process of critical self-reflection on one’s biases,
theoretical predispositions, preferences, and so forth” (Schwandt, 2015, p. 268). This is my
point of departure.
Theoretical Predispositions
What are my theoretical predispositions? Looking back at my publications from the
last decade, I would say my strongest theoretical predispositions lie in:
a) The belief that the cognitive impairment inherent to intellectual disability
creates a need for adapting social aspects of environments to enable
participation, for instance making sure information is available in a form the
person understands, avoiding using too complex terms in communication,
and giving the person sufficient time to respond.
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b) The precepts of the “social model of disability” (Oliver, 1996), that portray
such adaptations, on societal as well as individual levels, as a form of social
justice.
c) The idea that functional differences should not automatically be seen as
deficits, but in many cases can be considered legitimate and valuable
expressions of human diversity.
On one hand, these predispositions enable a clearer perspective on the role of the environment
in promoting accessibility, citizenship and agency. On the other, they entail a normative bias,
projecting a responsibility onto actors who interact with the person for adapting their behavior
according to his or her needs – responsibilities to which these actors may not agree or accept.
The danger is of ending up with better collaborations with informants with predispositions that
resemble my own, getting richer data from these cases than from cases where informants to a
lesser extent understand the situation and their role as I do. This is a scenario that would provide
the least opportunity for me to discover anything, to learn something, to transcend my existing
perceptions. Thus, in my research, I should also build in “checks and balances” on the tendency
to favor some cases. For instance, I could at regular intervals ask myself why I find certain
cases more interesting, challenging myself to keep exploring any cases I consider less
interesting. Some cases may in fact be less relevant, but if so, I should make sure I drop them
for lack of relevance, and not because the informants’ understandings are at odds with mine.
Thus, my first “rule of engagement” reads:
1. Pay sufficient interest to the “uninteresting” cases.
Interview Inquiries as Moral Enterprises
Another aspect is that theoretical models of disability are not “morally neutral.”
Traditionally, the exclusion of people with impairments, for instance from employment, has
been perceived as an unfortunate, but highly natural, consequence of their impairment (Oliver,
1996). Accordingly, regarding people with intellectual disability, many might attribute their
meager success in domains such as schools or the labor market to their cognitive impairment
alone. As a reaction to such dominant and largely taken-for-granted perceptions, a cornerstone
of the “environmental turn” that lies at the very heart of Disability studies was a 1976
declaration by the UK activist group Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation
(UPIAS). One paragraph reads:
In our view, it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability
is something imposed on top of our impairments, by the way we are
unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society. (UPIAS,
1976, p. 4)
Proceeding from this, for a person with cognitive impairment, disability may arise when s/he
meets inappropriate expectations of information handling or problem solving – for example,
when other people talk inappropriately fast, using inappropriately complex terms, or the person
is overwhelmed by the operation of a ticket vending machine that a majority of people would
understand. The social model has been hugely successful, at least on a policy level. For
instance, the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)
describes disability as a result of “interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal
and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an
equal basis with others” (UN, 2006). Albeit somewhat weaker than the UPIAS statement, this
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definition still shifts the gaze from solely focusing on the impairments, to including
environmental factors in the picture – factors that may be changed in order to enhance
participation. Thus, it is a hopeful message, but a message that must be understood and acted
on. It is likely that I will come across actions on the part of employers, supervisors or colleagues
that easily may be interpreted as barriers – for instance if they lack the will or ability to adjust
their modes of communication sufficiently. If so, I will have a dilemma on my hands. On one
hand, given the normative, critical stance that I described above, it is not farfetched to think
that I, during interviews, may come to act or react in ways that suggest I find something lacking
in how they act and interact with their employees with intellectual disability. I have been trained
in a health and social tradition of beneficence: doing good, and of non-maleficence: minimizing
harm. The last aspect may be particularly at stake here. An “interview inquiry is a moral
enterprise,” Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p. 62) write, one of the salient ethical issues being
“personal consequences of the interview interaction” such as “changes in self-understanding”
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 63). Per se, employers, supervisors or colleagues cannot be
considered a vulnerable group. Still, to receive what they experience as negative feedback from
a visiting researcher may threaten their wellbeing, and not least, perhaps curb their enthusiasm
for creating this job for an employee with intellectual disability – an enthusiasm which may be
main reason the job exists at all. Thus, my second “rule of engagement” is:
2. Be respectful of those who are willing to engage with us.
This may seem mundane. However, more important than appearing respectful, is to be
respectful. More than a mere superficial adaption of words and manners, this may require that
we develop a fundamental and genuine wish to meet and respect our informants as sources of
valuable information, no matter how their perspectives challenge us. Secondly, it may require
that we take it upon ourselves to work through our perceptions, assumptions and emotions to
the degree necessary to overcome that which may hinder us in being genuinely respectful.
Fields of Uncertainty
The origin of the word respect – the Latin respectare – means to “look again”: to review
and perhaps reconsider. A good reason to look beyond the feelings and perceptions of
employers, supervisors or colleagues – is that it is not they, but the employees with intellectual
disability who are the most vulnerable parties in these settings. The limitations of the latter in
reasoning, problem solving, planning and so forth do not render them powerless, but may
influence their ability to analyze their interaction and experiences with others, to understand
when others are making unreasonable demands or act in ways that are unhelpful, to understand
what specific aspects of others’ actions are unreasonable or unhelpful and speak up. Also, if
they are able to speak up, how articulate they are, how well they argue their case, and how
susceptible the other person is to their point of view may differ. Another side of this is that they
may be more vulnerable than most people to verbal persuasion, and to adopting the perspectives
of others. A danger is that they may come to accept work conditions that they should not, and
that most people, given similar circumstances, would not. What my response in such cases
should be is hard to know now, detached from a specific situation. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009)
refer to such issues as “fields of uncertainty”: Rather than seeing ethical questions as something
that can be settled once and for all in advance of the research project, we
conceptualize them as fields of uncertainty (i.e. problem areas that should
continually be addressed and reflected upon throughout an interview inquiry).
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 69, emphasis in original)
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Thus, the best I can do at present, is to be aware of this “field of uncertainty” and hope to be
able to identify the dilemmas when they arise and take the steps that present themselves as the
most right, or, as so often with dilemmas, the least wrong. My third “rule” reads:
3. Identify the dilemmas. Look at both sides. Tread carefully.
Some Pitfalls of Communication
However, regarding the vulnerability of employees with intellectual disability, any
caveats that might apply to employers’, supervisors’, or colleagues’ communication practices,
fully apply also to me. Interviewing employees, I plan to ask employees to let me participate
in their daily activity, invite them to show and explain their tasks to me, which also gives me
an opportunity to observe them, our interaction, their interaction with other people, as well as
ask questions. But what methodological and ethical challenges may arise from involving people
with intellectual disability as informants?
Sigstad (2014, p. 189) warns that the “difficulties in communication” that people with
intellectual disability often experience present particular challenges to research. Referring to
previous research, she notes that such difficulties may related to understanding grammatical
structures and concepts, formulating appropriate responses within a specific context, and the
asymmetrical relationship between researchers and informants. An “essential question,” she
writes, “is whether the difficulties of informants affect interviews to such an extent that the
reliability and validity of the results are weakened” (Sigstad, 2014, p. 189). Both reliability and
validity are epistemic criteria in research – criteria “concerned with justifying knowledge
claims as true, accurate, correct” (Schwandt, 2015, p. 46). Reliability, establishing procedures
and results as trustworthy, can be thought of as a necessary but not in itself sufficient criterion
“for establishing the truth of an account or interpretation” (Schwandt, 2015, p. 270). And,
regarding validity:
To say that the findings of social scientific investigations are (or must be) valid
is to argue that the findings are in fact (or must be) true and certain. Here, “true”
means that the findings accurately represent the phenomena to which they refer
and “certain” means that the findings are backed by evidence—or warranted—
and there are no good grounds for doubting the findings, or the evidence for the
findings in question is stronger than the evidence for alternative findings.
(Schwandt, 2015, p. 319)
Thus, Sigstad seems concerned with establishing “the truth of an account or interpretation of a
social phenomenon,” by – as far as possible – overcoming the challenges to obtaining truthful
answers from interviewees with intellectual disability.
What might prevent such truthfulness? One challenge is what has been described as a
tendency in people with intellectual disability to acquiesce – “a form of compliance in which
the informants respond according to what they believe is expected” (Sigstad, 2014, p. 192).
Thus, one worry may be that informants say “yes,” prompting us to record “yes,” whereas the
truth is something partly or wholly different. One of Sigstad’s sources is Finlay and Lyons
(2002). Reviewing research on acquiescence, they refer to a series of studies by Sigelman and
various colleagues in the 1980’s, that found a “systematic acquiescence bias in response to
yes/no questions,” for “factual as well as subjective questions,” a bias that also seems to be
“inversely related to IQ” (Finlay & Lyons, 2002, p. 15). Thus, lower IQ levels may correlate
with a more pronounced acquiescence bias. Although there are unresolved methodological
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issues around testing for acquiescence, the phenomenon seems well documented. However,
Finlay and Lyons (2002, p. 14) claim: “although researchers often stress a desire to please or
increased submissiveness as the most important factor, acquiescence should also be seen as a
response to questions that are too complex, either grammatically or in the type of judgments
they request.” Some of their suggestions are to reduce sentence complexity, ask for examples,
establish “don’t know” as a legitimate option to “yes” and “no,” script prompts and alternate
wordings with the same care as we script the initial questions, and avoid assuming that people
with intellectual disability are in a position to provide immediate answers to any question we
might ask (Finlay & Lyons, 2002, p. 23). Sigstad (2014, p. 197) also recommends using short
questions and simple sentences. Thus, a fourth “rule of engagement,” which in principle may
be seen to apply regardless of informant category:
4. Prepare questions with care. Make sure they are sufficiently adapted. More
important than what sense our questions make to us, is what sense they make
to our informants.
Establishing Common Understanding
Sigstad (2014, p. 198) also recommends allotting sufficient time to verify if
interviewees understand the questions, and, more controversially, suggests it “may be
necessary to assist the informants with suggestions for alternatives or to provide help with
completing sentences using conducive questions or repetition” (Sigstad, 2014, p. 200). She
provides an example, where she (I) interviews a secondary school student (S) with mild
intellectual disability:
I: What are you allowed to decide at school?
S: I don’t know.
I: Here at school, when you are in class, is there anything that you are allowed
to decide?
S: Yes. If we have time, so it happens that we are playing something.
I: So that you can choose it?
S: Yes.
I: When you have spare time?
S: Um.
I: How do you like making decisions about what to do at school?
S: Yes.
I: Is it okay to decide on something?
S: Um. (Sigstad, 2014, p. 192)
The exchange may be interpreted as showing acquiescence: Of six responses, five are
affirmative. Four are single syllable affirmations, including answering “Yes” when asked
“How do you like making decisions about what to do at school?” as if the “How” was either
not heard, understood or acknowledged. This resonates with Finlay and Lyons’ (2002, p. 22)
warning that sentences with modifying clauses may create problems with understanding. The
exchange does not seem to include conducive questions. The question “When you have spare
time?” follows directly from the “time” clause in the student’s single elaborated answer: “Yes.
If we have time, so it happens that we are playing something.” The previous question, “So that
you can choose it?” seems to follow from the reasonable inference that the student’s answer is
a cognizant response to “in class, is there anything that you are allowed to decide?” The fullness
of the student’s answer seems to strengthen that inference, and it may seem that a common
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understanding has been established. Still, there are two perceptible leaps from what the student
says at first, to the understandings, or meanings, that seem to be established: First, that the
student in given situations is at liberty to choose to play (or what to play), and second, that s/he
values this. The questions and answers seem to bridge these gaps, however, in each case, the
substance of the “bridge” is still only based on one “Yes” and one “Um” on part of the student,
with no further elaboration.
Nothing conclusive can be drawn from such a short excerpt. But it does illustrate that
in interviewing people with intellectual disability, establishing a common understanding may
require more projection on part of researchers, as well as needing to trust more tenuous links
of meaning. If interviewees struggle with understanding grammatical structures and concepts,
they also will be less able to pick up on any misinterpretations on the part of the interviewer
and correct them. All this points to a need for supplementary sources in the interpretive work.
Not to check the “truth” of statements – as Finlay and Lyons (2002) describe was done in early
research on acquiescence, where participant answers were checked with caregivers in order to
catch discrepancies that might betray acquiescence – but rather in the vein of Caldwell’s
description of “dyadic interviewing”: The answers from informants remain the primary source,
but in addition, informants identify key support persons who also may be questioned, their
answers thus representing secondary, supplementary sources (Caldwell, 2014). Building on
that, establishing interpretive teams around informants may be envisioned – teams where the
person him/herself provides the main voice, but other team members fill in answers, contribute
to catching and correcting misunderstandings, as well as teasing out what “the truth” of matters
may be, to the extent that the informant is not in a position to settle this alone. Hence, my fifth
“rule of engagement”:
5. Consider if establishing interpretive teams may assist informants in
assembling fuller accounts than they are able to provide alone.
And again, in principle this may apply regardless of informant category: Even if informants do
not have the specific difficulties of communication that people with intellectual disability may
experience, we may still ask ourselves: Are there instances where informants’ accounts may
benefit from inviting them to invite other parties to join them in the interview – not to supplant
their own perspectives, but to supplement and enhance them?
The Question of Prejudices
At the same time, assuming that it is possible to establish any “true meaning” of
informants’ utterances, through such or other means, may be a fallacy. Given that intellectual
disability is a label that is applied in cases where people experience a reduced ability to think,
reason and judge, we cannot take for granted that answers to all manner of “ordinary” questions
exist. The person may not have the necessary concepts to grasp the matters we inquire about –
because s/he has not had the opportunity to develop them, or because such concepts forever
may be beyond his or her intellectual reach. This means that along a scale of increasing
complexity, our interpretations may at some point so obviously become constructions, that they
no longer can be called expressions of the person’s meaning. This is not to say that other
interpretations are not constructions. Interpretations will always be sensitive to the extent and
the quality of shared cultural meaning and linguistic practices of informants in communicative
interactions. But in these cases, the line between what can reliably be assumed and what simply
must be considered conjecture may appear sooner, as a result of interviewees’ reduced
cognitive capacity.
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There is another aspect to this: To the extent that interpretations are constructions, of
what are they constructed? More precisely, what are the cultural and cognitive contributions of
interviewers in creating meaning – contributions that together with interviewees’ utterances
form such links of meaning as can be called findings or data? And how can such contribution
be reconciled with achieving satisfactory reliability and validity? Addressing this, Sigstad notes
that researchers should “attempt to maintain distance from their own prejudices, which are
often closely related to their own understanding of intellectual disabilities” (2014, p. 196). As
a methodological recommendation, this portrays “prejudices” as a negative factor, a source of
bias that, as far as possible, should be banished through sound research methodology. However,
some scholars beg to differ:
The devotion to method as holding the key to sound inquiry is predicated on the
assumption that we need some means of removing our tendencies as everyday
human beings to be biased or prejudiced in our investigations of social life….
In light of this understanding of method, bias or prejudice is always defined
negatively as something that interferes with, prevents, or inhibits having true,
genuine knowledge. … it is precisely this understanding of method and
prejudice that is severely criticized by advocates of philosophical hermeneutics.
(Schwandt, 2015, pp. 18-19)
A main focus in hermeneutics is conditions for understanding and interpretation. Its origins
were in the study of historical texts, where the goal was to achieve interpretations of texts that
as closely as possible re-experienced and re-created authors’ consciousness, life and historical
period (Thornquist, 2003, pp. 139-140). To achieve this, historians should attempt to “remove
themselves” from the interpretative process: Hans-Georg Gadamer, one of the central figures
of philosophical hermeneutics, refers to 19th century scholars Ranke, who described “the
extinguishing of the individual” as the ideal, and Schleiermacher, who defined hermeneutics
as “the art of avoiding misunderstanding” (Gadamer, 1977, pp. 5-7). Gadamer has no quarrel
with the goal of avoiding misunderstanding, “to exclude by controlled, methodical
consideration … misunderstanding suggested to us by distance in time, change in linguistic
usages, or in the meanings of words and modes of thinking” (Gadamer, 1977, p. 7). But he
rejects the basic premise – that the
understander is seen … not in relationship to the hermeneutical situation and
the constant operativeness of history in his own consciousness, but in such a
way as to imply that his own understanding does not enter into the event. But
this is simply not the case. (Gadamer, 1977, p. 28)
Thus, one of the goals of philosophical hermeneutics is to rehabilitate the maligned concept of
prejudices. To Gadamer,
prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of
our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the
world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience something –
whereby what we encounter says something to us. (Gadamer, 1977, p. 9)
Following Gadamer, understanding is interpreting. There are no ways of understanding that
bypass our prejudices, because our prejudices are the means by which we understand: This is
the fundamental hermeneutic condition. And, related to science, this posits “the hermeneutical
experience” as “prior to all methodical alienation, because it is the matrix out of which arise
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the questions that it then directs to science” (Gadamer, 1977, p. 26). Hence, if our prejudices
are the conditions by which we understand, no methodology can eliminate them. Rather, we
must work with and through our prejudices – our preunderstandings – unveil them, “catch them
in the act” so to speak, through hermeneutic reflection: “Reflection on a given
preunderstanding brings before me something that otherwise happens behind my back,”
Gadamer (1977, p. 38, emphasis in original) writes. And such reflection, he insists, “teaches
us: that social community, with all its tensions and disruptions, ever and ever again leads back
to a common area of social understanding through which it exists” (Gadamer, 1977, p. 42).
One entry point to hermeneutic reflection may then be those experiences that seem alien, that
provoke us, seem to offend a common or professional propriety – all manners of “friction” that
may alert us to our own modes of preunderstanding, provide us with clues:
There is always a world already interpreted, already organized in its basic
relations, into which experience steps as something new, upsetting what has led
our expectations.... Only the support of familiar and common understanding
makes possible the venture into the alien, the lifting up of something out of the
alien, and thus the broadening and enrichment of our own experience of the
world. (Gadamer, 1977, p. 15)
Thus, my sixth “rule of engagement” is:
6. Value the upsetting, alien or offensive as unique sources of clues to our own
modes of preunderstanding.
Tensions, Disruptions and Conflicts of Interest
Gadamer refers to “tensions and disruptions” inherent in social community but
emphasizes the “common area” which community “ever and ever” leads back to. Both he and
philosophical hermeneutics has been criticized for overly relying on tradition, neglecting
societal structures and the relationship between language and power (Thornquist, 2003, p. 172).
Some supporters find this critique overstated: “To recognize the historicity of the knower does
not contest the importance of attempts at critical interpretation, nor does it impair the operation
of scientific understanding in the slightest,” Linge writes (in Gadamer, 1977, xviii). Gadamer
himself does not exclude that the hermeneutic dimension has also “fundamental significance”
for the “revolutionary consciousness that unhinges the tradition through emancipatory
reflection” (Gadamer, 1977, p. 18). Yet, at the same time he states that “there would be no
hermeneutical task if there were no mutual understanding that has been disturbed, and that
those involved in a conversation must search for and find again together” (Gadamer, 1977, p.
25). Thus, one of the bedrocks of Gadamer’s hermeneutics still seems to be a notion that social
community builds on a “common area,” forms of mutual understanding that may be disturbed,
but also restored through mutual effort. This seems to overstate the commensurability of human
interests, as well as understate the effect that the building blocks of “social community” may
have on any “understander’s” room to reflect:
Social structures and cognitive structures are recursively and structurally linked,
and the correspondence that obtains between them provides one of the most
solid props of social domination. Classes and other antagonistic social
collectives are continually engaged in a struggle to impose the definition of the
world that is most congruent with their particular interests. (Waquant, 1992, p.
14)
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The social model of disability is an example of such definitional struggle. In defining disability
as a result of “interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental
barriers” (UN, 2006), the emphasis is shifted to the exclusionary effects of majority based
“common areas” and “mutual understandings”: The assumptions of a societal majority, what
most members take for granted as aspects of a more or less given reality, may result in disabling
barriers for minorities with differing needs and functioning. The features of built environments
that are understood as barriers – for instance stairs or curbs to wheel chair users – do not
represent any “given reality” before adaptations. The environment is already adapted – to
accommodate the needs and preferences of a societal majority, those who are “abled” by such
planning and building practices. The question from a social model perspective would therefore
not be whether or not a space is adapted – but for whom it is adapted. The same applies to what
can be referred to as “ordinary” communication and conversation, that also does not represent
any “given reality” before adaptations: It is already more or less adapted – to the needs and
preferences of the majority, who are “abled” by such ways of communication. Hence, disabling
barriers may not only be built, but also performed. In such case, “building them down” may
require changes in social practices. This calls into question the will and ability of the majority
to make adaptations to the scale necessary to fulfil such lofty and only partially defined goals
as the “full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others” (UN, 2006,
n.p.) for persons with disabilities (Owren, 2013; Owren & Stenhammer, 2013).
Whether such goals are “fulfillable” or not, does not change the fact that actors may
express differing interests, and that looking explicitly for tensions, disruptions and conflicts of
interest that can be traced to social structures on levels beyond the cognitive structures of the
actors themselves may be significant. My seventh “rule of engagement”:
7. Look for tensions, disruptions and conflicts of interest between actors.
Facilitating Rupture
Using political science as an example, Charles Taylor (1971, p. 22), writes about what
he refers to as an empiricist “identification of acts by means of institutional rules. Thus …
leaving the room, saying or writing a certain form of words, counts as breaking off the
negotiations.” His point is that actors may bring all sorts of beliefs, attitudes, feelings or goals
into negotiations, and that these are phenomena on an individual, subjective level (Taylor,
1971, p. 27). However,
what they do not bring into the negotiations is the set of ideas and norms
constitutive of negotiation themselves. These must be the common property of
the society before there can be any question of anyone entering into negotiation
or not. Hence they are not subjective meanings, the property of one or some
individuals, but rather intersubjective meanings, which are constitutive of the
social matrix in which individuals find themselves and act. (Taylor, 1971, p. 27)
Thus, intersubjective meanings on a level constitutive of social reality will only represent one
of many ways a social reality may be constituted. What is considered hard fact in our culture
may not exist within another. The dilemma he presents concerns the criteria of judgement in a
hermeneutical science: How can we know our interpretations are correct? Presumable because
they make sense. But such sense can only be made by referring to larger frameworks – which
themselves in turn are premised on interpretations. If our interpretations are challenged, and
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the challenger refuses to accept our attempts to make sense, we may have to give up (Taylor,
1971, pp. 5-6). Gadamer also touches on this, when he compares hermeneutics to rhetoric:
Rhetoric from oldest tradition has been the only advocate of a claim to truth that
defends the probable, the eikós (verisimile), and that which is convincing to the
ordinary reason, against the claim of science to accept as true only what can be
demonstrated and tested! Convincing and persuading, without being able to
prove – these are obviously as much the aim and measure of understanding and
interpretation as they are the aim and measure of the art of oration and
persuasion. (Gadamer, 1977, p. 24, emphasis in original)
Bourdieu also refers to this, writing about constructing the scientific object, the object of
research: Such construction “requires first and foremost a break with common sense, that is,
with the representations shared by all, whether they be the mere commonplaces of ordinary
existence or official representations, often inscribed in institutions” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 235).
Such breaks with common sense may be in the form of rupture:
How are we to effect this rupture? How can the sociologist escape the
underhanded persuasion which is exercised on her every time she reads the
newspapers or watches television or even when she reads the work of her
colleagues? The mere fact of being on the alert is important but hardly suffices.
One of the most powerful instruments of rupture lies in the social history of
problems, objects, and instruments of thought. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 238)
Apart from tracing the social history – in my case, of the category intellectual disability, of
practices related to intellectual disability, of exclusionary and inclusionary processes –
Bourdieu has a suggestion on a methodological level to “guard against regression to the
‘reality’ of preconstructed social units”: Use a square-table. Enter the pertinent properties of
cases, each on a separate line. Create a new column each time a new property necessary to
characterize one of them is discovered and proceed to question all the other cases on the
presence or absence of this particular property (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 230). Thereby, cases are
questioned on something that does not spring from researchers’ prejudices – from what seems
“natural” because it is aligned with our customary ways of thinking – but from a more
systematic questioning that goes beyond researchers’ own associations. Still, the properties to
be questioned are limited to the researcher’s existing mindset. Might one go further?
Gadamer refers to the possibility of unforeseen constellations – that within scientists’
experience, “it is not so much the ‘laws of ironclad inference’ … that present fruitful ideas,”
but “rather unforeseen constellations that kindle the spark of scientific inspiration (e.g.,
Newton’s falling apple)” (Gadamer, 1977, p. 13). So, what place do falling apples have in
systematic inquiry? Can one plan for the unexpected, facilitate the possibly inspiring chance
event, the hitherto unforeseen constellations? Here, we enter the turf of British musician and
producer Brian Eno. Known for his collaboration with bands such as Roxy Music, U2 and
Talking Heads, he is also known for Oblique Strategies, a deck of cards he designed with artist
Peter Schmidt. Eno explains: “The idea of Oblique Strategies was just to dislocate my vision
for a while. By means of performing a task that might seem absurd in relation to the picture,
one can suddenly come at it from a tangent and possibly reassess it” (cited in O’Brien, 1978).
The cards are designed to be picked at random. Three of these cards read: “Look closely at the
most embarrassing details and amplify them,” and “Take away the elements in order of
apparent non importance,” and “Discard an axiom” (Eno & Schmidt, 1979, in Marshall &
Loydell, 2016). Eno explains further:
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When I work there are two distinct phases: the phase of pushing the work along,
getting something to happen, where all the input comes from me, and phase two,
where things start to combine in a way that wasn’t expected or predicted by
what I supplied. Once phase two begins everything is okay, because then the
work starts to dictate its own terms. It starts to get an identity which demands
certain future moves. But during the first phase you often find that you come to
a full stop. You don’t know what to supply. And it’s at that stage that I will pull
one of the cards out. (as cited in O’Brien, 1978)
There are obvious parallels to parts of the qualitative research process, such as analysis, where
a goal precisely may be that “the work” – here, our findings – start to dictate their own terms,
get an identity. Thus, one way of working towards this may be to utilize elements that, as this
deck of cards does, introduces a degree of randomness at points where the process slows or
stops, as a way to “dislocate vision for a while,” introduce “unforeseen constellations,” “come
at the material from a tangent and possibly reassess it.” My eighth “rule of engagement” reads:
8. Systematically transfer properties between cases. Facilitate unforeseen
constellations. Seek rupture.
Go Back to Start
The young man with intellectual disability and his workplace mentor are being
interviewed on stage, in front of approximately 700 conference attendees, one of them me. The
young man is exercising voice. I am uncomfortably thinking of ways he is being victimized.
To the extent that he is not discomforted – and I see no evidence that he is – my normative,
critical stance is of course deeply paternalistic. “Discussion of voice,” Caldwell notes, “is a
fundamental methodological consideration for qualitative researchers working with individuals
with ID [intellectual disability] given the extent to which historically their voices have been so
pervasively silenced, segregated, and oppressed” (2014, p. 490). Gadamer noted that: “The real
power of hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable” (1977, p. 13).
The young man is on stage, exercising voice. He may not understand the normative, critical
perceptions that his performance is engendering in parts of the audience, namely me. But in
my attempt to fill a researcher role, I should probably be more interested in his perspective than
in my own, at least at this point. And rather than suspect the situation that unfolds on stage
from my perspective, I might try to let the situation suspect my perspective. In a seminal essay,
“Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias,” Michel Foucault introduced the concept of heterotopic
spaces – spaces “that have the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but
in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to
designate, mirror, or reflect” (Foucault, 1984). From such spaces, the mainstream looks
different. And because the mainstream looks different, they offer those of us who inhabit the
mainstream an “outside perspective.” Thus, when the young man described his enjoyment in
hosing down emergency exits, perhaps the interviewer truly had a vision of the joys that may
come of hosing down emergency exits, and simply shared his vision in a burst of exuberance.
The astute researcher would at least consider that people mean exactly what they say. And
when the interviewer asked for the young man’s opinion of his mentor – did he not also provide
him an opportunity to profess his satisfaction before many, to pay a homage that I have no
doubt was sincere? Should that opportunity have been taken “off the table” in advance, to avoid
a possible embarrassment that never materialized, or to satisfy bureaucratic righteousness? And
when we all laughed in the face of the young man’s eagerness, of the sheer unstoppable energy
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of a new broom under a horizon of new possibility – should it be ruled out that we may simply
have shared his joy? No. My final “rule of engagement” is:
9. Look for the heterotopic possibilities.
Enhancing Reflexivity: Owren’s Nine
1)
2)
3)
4)

5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

Pay sufficient interest to the “uninteresting” cases.
Be respectful of those who are willing to engage with us.
Identify the dilemmas. Look at both sides. Tread carefully.
Prepare questions with care. Make sure they are sufficiently adapted. More
important that what sense our questions make to us, is what sense they make
to our informants.
Consider if establishing interpretive teams may assist informants in
assembling fuller accounts than they are able to provide alone.
Value the upsetting, alien or offensive as unique sources of clues to our own
modes of preunderstanding.
Look for tensions, disruptions and conflicts of interest between actors.
Systematically transfer properties between cases. Facilitate unforeseen
constellations. Seek rupture.
Look for the heterotopic possibilities.
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